“It is a historic victory,” scribbled Björn Höcke immediately after the announcement of the first election results in Saxony and Thuringia. And he wasn’t far off. In Thuringia, the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) made gains of 9.4% to become the strongest force there, with 32.8%. In Saxony, they swayed 3% in their favour to come a close second place to the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU). These results are roughly comparable to those of the Nazis in the last elections to the Reichstag in 1932, a fact which can hardly have escaped the notice of Höcke, a former history teacher who can even officially be called a fascist.

The usual attempts to explain the growth of the AfD’s share of the vote as purely a result of protest votes no longer holds water. All investigations into the election results assume that people have voted for the AfD repeatedly and with conviction. Particularly noteworthy is their share of the vote among young people (38%) and workers (49%). They received more votes among men than among women, with 38% compared to 27%. This result is also partly thanks to the decades-long groundwork laid by fascist forces in the East German states, during which a right-wing hegemony was won in many places. In particular, this will embolden militant Nazi forces to commit further violent attacks, the likes of which we have seen during Christopher Street Day (Germany’s equivalent to Pride) in several East German cities. Queer people are increasingly getting caught in the crosshairs of the extreme right. At the same time, attacks and pogroms against refugee accommodations are becoming a possibility; indeed, given the racist climate being whipped up, a likelihood.

Particularly shrewd strategists have long cherished the hope that the supposed “left-wing conservative” Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht, BSW) could take the wind out of the sails of the AfD votes with a combination of nationalist rhetoric for peace and “migration-critical” positions. This was proven to be a delusion immediately after the EU elections. Even if the BSW could win over a minute portion of the AfD’s votes, they recruited the majority of their voter base from across the spectrum of that of the Linkspartei, who had obviously underestimated this openness to authoritarian nationalist positions among their own voter base. This confirms our assessment that the spectrum of voters for the Linkspartei never represented any genuine left-wing potential. The party that calls itself “the Left” (Die Linke) was never the expression of any significant leftward shift against a backdrop of intensifying class struggle, but merely of the weakness of the approach of social movements. Their calculation, and their original function, has from the very beginning been to channel any kind of potential for protest (especially in East Germany) through parliament and convert it into electoral participation. The consequences of the policy of austerity, which Die Linke supported, have played no insignificant role in their recent electoral defeats. Though not yet quite dead and buried, Die Linke seem for the time being to have reached the end of the useful function they have played.

As for the BSW, their increasing turn towards openly reactionary and nationalist positions is plain to see, not least in Wagenknecht’s most recent agitation against recipients of the citizen’s allowance (Germany’s equivalent to Universal Credit). Whether and to what extent the BSW will be able to consolidate and expand upon their recent electoral success, which they owe primarily to older voters, remains to be seen. Also unclear is the extent to which they will be able to continue their life as a parliamentary party with their current transparent basis of members and functionaries and authoritarian party structure tailored around one person. In light of the possibility of the BSW taking a role in government at the state level and the near-inevitable disillusionment that this would engender, the project could very quickly prove to be a damp squib.

Against this backdrop, the AfD is teeming with self-confidence and shedding the last of its inhibitions. Their fascist core is becoming ever clearer, as shown by the demand raised in Brandenburg for a ban on refugees attending public events and a ban on the rainbow flag in public spaces. In their current phase, the AfD is not yet a fully fledged fascist party. However, with their strategy of targeted provocation they have increasingly emerged as the vessel and parliamentary mouthpiece of the fascists, through whose social media channels the most reactionary positions are finding a hearing in ever-widening circles of society. What was no more than the sick violent fantasy harboured by neoreactionary circles a few short years ago is now fast becoming bitter reality.

As it stands, the established parties are still ruling out the possibility of forming a coalition government with the AfD, which the AfD exploit in their propaganda to paint themselves as the victim, and as the advocate of the great silent majority. But the much-vaunted firewall against the AfD has not been simply shot to pieces. Instead, it has been and continues to be undermined to the point of collapse on the level of local government, which is increasing the pressure on the leaders of the established parties, above all the CDU, to act. That supposed firewall has never been anything more nor less than a democratic facade to present the implementation of racist “emergency” laws as a necessary evil. As we wrote at the beginning of the year,

The oft-invoked “firewall against the right” reveals itself in this way to be a self-ligating contradiction. While they position themselves rhetorically against the AfD, asylum laws are being tightened further, the police and security apparatus expanded, and thus the central points of the AfD’s programme implemented. The most cynical politicians justify this by claiming to hope that this will “demystify” the AfD and steal their wind from their sails. But in fact, the AfD have only grown in favour and strength. Now as ever they find themselves in the exceptionally comfortable position of being able to increase and escalate their demands, and to present themselves as a particularly consistent representative of an authoritative solution to the crisis.⁽¹⁾

The Madhouse of Democracy: The Migration Debate

This development continues. Since the suspected Islamist attack in Solingen, we have been witnessing a veritable contest of racism between the government and the opposition: services and funds for the integration of refugees are to be cut, border controls tightened, so-called “anchor centres” (that is, detention centres) for refugees built and deportations carried out more quickly and more rigorously. Immediately prior to the elections in Saxony and Thuringia, and for the first time in the three years since the Taliban returned to power, “criminals required to leave the country” were deported to Afghanistan, where they faced the threat of serious human rights violations. This was directly preceded by negotiations with Qatar and other key powers in the region, a process which not so long ago would have been inconceivable and which flies in the face of the European Convention on Human Rights. Chancellor Olaf Scholz hailed this as a “clear signal” and a “great success”; one on which, come election time, the AfD was ultimately able to capitalise. Meanwhile, voices are mounting in favour of direct dialogue with the Assad regime in Syria and the Islamist Taliban in order to enable “large-scale deportations”.

All of this gave the AfD a sizeable boost in their election campaign, who were once again able to claim that the “old parties” had “taken up their central demands on migration” but failed to implement them consistently enough.

With the predictable “shock of Saxony and Thuringia”, the so-called migration debate really gained some traction. The leader of the CDU parliamentary group, Friedrich Merz, has proposed a general halt in taking in refugees from Syria and Afghanistan, while his rival for chancellery, Markus Söder, has pondered aloud the possibility of amending the constitution to completely abolish the individual right to asylum.

Such demands have served and continue to serve above all to stir up populist sentiment, and as indicators of an early general election campaign. In their thrust and substance, they appear scarcely legally feasible, and largely irreconcilable with the constitution, as left liberals never tire of pointing out. However, such views are founded in unfounded confidence in the “democratic legal order”. The amendment to asylum law in the 1990s should suffice to show the creativity of civil law when it comes to adapting jurisprudence to suit its own agenda. This was when the category of a “safe third country” was created to limit possible asylum applications to Germany.

Trouble in Fortress Europe

To this “Third State Regulation” was then added the perfidious support of the “Dublin Process”, which came into force in 1997 and was implemented at the European level by Germany, which had by then become a political and economic powerhouse. It stipulates that the first EU country into which a refugee enters bears the responsibility for their asylum process. This was then a calculation on the part of Germany to intercept the influx of refugees at the external borders of the EU, an ambition which has proved downright absurd in light of the euro crisis and its consequent social devastation at the periphery of the EU. This resulted in violent disputes between EU member states, in which Germany, in its role as its paymaster, endeavoured to act conservatively and in a moderating manner. In the wake of the so-called “refugee crisis” of 2015, they revealed themselves to be just as willing to buy time through the equally dirty “Turkey Deal”, worth millions in terms of “refugee policy”. And with the migration debate ignited once again, another fateful “turning point” is looming.

Germany is insisting on strict compliance with the Dublin Convention. Refugees whose asylum application falls in the lap of another EU state (which thanks to Germany’s geographical location is almost all of them) are to be detained and deported more speedily. For the CDU and sections of the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP), this does not go far enough! They demand stricter border controls and a blanket rejection of refugees at the German border, even if they apply for asylum. This would violate international and European law alike, and lead to heated conflicts within the EU. To date, Austria and Poland have made it unequivocally clear that they have no desire to take in any rejected refugees. However, at the so-called “Migration Summit”, the CDU broke off negotiations with the government on precisely this question, an indication if ever one were needed that significant sections of the capitalist class are pushing for unambiguous and aggressive emphasis on Germany’s claim to supremacy at the EU level. At the same time, behind the demand to seal off Germany’s borders lies a cold-blooded and misanthropic calculation: the assumption that it would trigger a chain reaction in which other EU member states such as Bulgaria, Greece, and Italy might follow suit in tightening their borders or sealing them off completely. The deadly consequence of which would be even more people drowning, starving and being persecuted to death at the borders of the EU.

The Days of Plenty are Numbered!

Most commentators attributed the AfD’s runaway success to the catastrophic record of the “Traffic Light Coalition” – the red-yellow-green alliance of the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD), the FDP and the Greens. Indeed, the Traffic Light Coalition was torn apart by its own fierce internal contradictions from the word go, and could scarcely keep its centrifugal force under control. The question has even been raised as to whether it will last until the end of the legislative period. Surveys claim that 71% of those polled said that the coalition government was performing “rather poorly”. Yet, in spite of these damning figures, only 38% of respondents believed that the CDU/CSU Union would do a better job of governing. 12% believed that the Union would do even worse, and 45% saw no difference. In this vacuum, the AfD and even the BSW could well make further strides.

The reasons for this shock to the system of party politics lie deeper, and can only be understood in the context of the intensifying global crisis. The outbreak of war in Ukraine constituted a decisive turning point for the capitalist class of Germany both strategically and economically.⁽²⁾ In light of the new alignment of powers, the German government had no choice but to enter into a bloc with the USA, a move which more or less implied a direct confrontation with China. The loss of the cheap supply of Russian natural gas, on which German industry was heavily dependent, was a severe blow to the export economy, and new dependencies emerged in energy policies. Yet as before, the geopolitical dilemma of the German capitalist class can be summarised as follows: on the one hand, Germany needs the transatlantic alliance with the USA (in particular militarily); on the other, China turning its back on the core sectors of German industry would spell a catastrophe.⁽³⁾ This dilemma is creating fierce conflicts within the German capitalist class which is then reflected on the stage of domestic politics. Their only point of unity is the tactic of going on the offensive through massive military and energy rearmament and preparing and implementing an authoritarian policy of austerity. Thus the rise of the AfD is above all the result of a rightward development of the entire bourgeois political system.

The recent slumps in the already struggling automobile industry are indicators of a dramatic downturn. German automobile manufacturers have lost important shares in the Chinese market and are increasingly on the defensive in the face of new competitors. The automotive industry threatens to erode away the very driving force of the German economic model. The announcements of factory closures and redundancies by the Volkswagen Group spell thousands of jobs lost across the entire automotive industry, whose effects will be felt among a large number of suppliers, but also other sectors such as the steel, chemical and construction industries.

Perspectives

In light of the imminent social attacks, it is only logical that the German bourgeoisie is playing the racist card and trying to make refugees and migrants scapegoats for the social crisis, for the lack of housing and daycare places, for dilapidated schools and low wages. This propaganda takes hold in a social climate characterised by isolation and fears of social decline. According to the latest surveys, 77% of respondents are in favour of a more restrictive asylum policy. As long as this continues, defeats in the next social conflicts are inevitable. It would be a grave error in this situation to seek salvation in broad-church alliances for the defence of democracy, which position themselves as a moral authority against “any extremism” and thus claim to outdo the right-wing hegemony. The massive demonstrations of the spring have shown all too clearly how quickly a movement can fizzle out if it fails to establish points of reference to everyday social life and its conflicts, an essential condition if they hope to counter the right-wing narratives.

The last time left-wing forces were able to exert any significant influence on a social movement was a long time ago; in our estimation, 20 years ago to be exact, in the Monday demonstrations against the Hartz IV reforms in 2004. The role they played then had disastrous consequences and quickly led to the exhaustion of the movement, followed by the defeat of their colleagues at Opel Bochum and later at Bosch Siemens Hausgerätewerk in Berlin. These are just a few excerpts in the story of a long retreat by our class. Since then, the left has been focusing on identity politics or trying to portray itself as a social movement, the results of which speak for themselves.

The conditions in which we must build an effective class resistance against the impending attacks are not particularly favourable. The working class in Germany has no established traditions of resistance. Above all, there is a lack of experience of struggle. There is virtually no experience of a joint struggle between East and West German workers. The bosses at Volkswagen will probably take advantage of this and target their colleagues at the East German sites (e.g. in Zwickau) first. The common practice of playing off permanent staff against flexible and precarious workers has so far paid off for the capitalists. Let us never forget that the unions have always played along with this game and have taken the lead in organising it in order to retain their interpretive sovereignty and, above all, their control over the wage struggles. The division between the German and migrant sectors of the class, which is virtually cemented by the identity-political mystifications that are currently very fashionable, is particularly serious.

The first step and the most urgent task of internationalist communists in this situation is to take an uncompromising stand against every form of racism, against all exceptional laws and administrative practices directed against migrants and refugees. Only on this basis will it be possible in the long term to create an awareness of the need for unconditional international solidarity, for class unity against all attacks by the ruling class. We will urgently need this unity if we want to prevail in the upcoming social conflicts. It is obvious that in the current situation this requires constant swimming against the tide. But this is the only way we can create the conditions to lay the foundations for a communist organisational approach through a combination of principled propaganda and flexible intervention.

Notes:

Image: Olgierd (CC BY-SA 2.0), commons.wikimedia.org

(1) Not Just Against the AfD!

(2) For the contours of the German export model, see the text Germany and the Eurocrisis: Limits to an Expansionist Project

(3) See also Notes on the Political Situation in Germany